Abstract. A choice-theoretic cash-in-advance model is constructed to examine foreign exchange controls. While foreign exchange controls improve the trade balance and the balance of payments (or exchange rate) they reduce welfare for a distortion-free small open economy. This is because foreign exchange controls essentially place a quota on imports. Shocks to the terms of trade are shown to be transmitted negatively to the domestic economy when exchange controls are in effect. Devaluations are found not to have real effects. Finally, it is argued that foreign exchange controls are not the optimal policy for attaining trade balance objectives.
INTRODUCTION
The use of foreign exchange controls is widespread in the world economy today. As the figures presented in table 1 indicate, 43 per cent of all IMF member countries had exchange controls throughout the six-year period from 1978-83, while 68 per cent of all IMF member countries had exchange controls at some time during the period. It can also be seen from table 1 that, as has been true for quantitative restrictions generally, the use of exchange con- trols has been rising in recent years. Half of all IMF members had exchange controls in 1978, and by 1983 the figure had risen to about two-thirds. It is also apparent that there is a strong tendency for foreign exchange controls, once enacted, to become a permanent part of the economic environment. Additionally, in the formal analysis that comprises the body of this paper it is shown that under certain conditions multiple exchange rate systems entailing different rates for imports and exports are equivalent to exchange controls. Table 2 , therefore, provides some evidence on the use of multiple exchange rate systems. As can be seen, multiple exchange rate systems are not nearly as popular a means of intervening in foreign exchange markets as are exchange controls. It should be noted, however, that there is a much stronger tendency for multiple exchange rate systems to be enacted for only a short period of time, that is, to be a temporary policy. In the light of the widespread use of exchange controls it is important for economists to have a clear understanding about how such controls affect national economies. This paper examines foreign exchange controls from the perspective of positive economics. The analysis is conducted within the context of a choice-theoretic general equilibrium model which Helpmnan (1981) proposed as a framework for evaluating alternative exchange rate regimes. This modelling strategy is chosen because it highlights how the adoption of foreign exchange controls limits the opportunity sets facing individuals and alters the incentive structure facing them. Once the effect of foreign exchange controls on agents' decision rules is established, it is then easy to infer their ramifications for an economy's general equilibrium.
It is shown that foreign exchange controls effectively place a quota on imports, thus raising their domestic relative price in the same manner as a tariff would. While the adoption of foreign exchange controls may improve both the trade balance and the balance of payments (or exchange rate), these controls tend to reduce welfare for a distortion-free small open economy. Imposing foreign exchange controls, in a sense, transforms the imported goods market into a non-traded goods market, and it is shown that this results in terms of trade shocks being transmitted negatively to the domestic economy. The paper also examines the effects of devaluation in a foreign exchange control setting. It is shown that unlike the situation with capital controls, the presence of foreign exchange controls is not a sufficient condition for a devaluation to have real effects. Finally, the question of whether foreign exchange controls are the optimal instrument to obtain trade balance and balance of payments objectives is addressed. It is argued that they are not the optimal tool for obtaining either of these non-economic objectives.
THE REPRESENTATIVE AGENT'S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Imagine a small open economy with either a fixed or flexible exchange rate and with a system of foreign exchange controls in place. The economy is inhabited by a representative agent who lives for two periods and desires to maximize his lifetime utility, U, as given by
t=1
where p is his subjective rate of discount, and Xt and Zt + Z are his consumption of exportables and importables in period t.1 The representative agent has two sources of income. In each period t he is endowed with a certain quantity of the exported good, Xt, and the imported It is assumed that the utility function is a strictly quasi-concave class C function. The term Zt in V() is a constant and merely serves to simplify the analysis. This will be readily apparent later on. good, Zt. The exported good can be freely sold in world markets, and its price is thus subject to the arbitrage condition pt = etP*t, t = 1, 2, where pt(p*t) is the domestic (foreign) currency price of exportables and et the exchange rate. Owing to the presence of foreign exchange controls, a similar arbitrage condition does not hold for importables. Also, in each period t the agent receives from the domestic government a nominal transfer payment, Tt.
The sequencing of the economy's monetary transactions is crucial for determining the constraints facing the representative agent. However, since the sequencing of transactions is similar to that adopted by Helpman (1981), only a brief description will be given here. The representative agent enters period t with a certain amount of domestic and foreign money to spend left over from the previous period. At the beginning of period t the individual receives domestic currency from his sales of goods during period t -1 and a nominal transfer payment of Tt. The agent then enters the asset market and redeems the bonds he purchased during the previous period, which are now worth (1 + r*)bt-I in terms of the exported good, where r* is the world real interest rate (denominated in terms of the export good), purchases new bonds of amount bt, and allocates his holdings of cash between domestic and foreign currency in the amounts Mt and M*t. The agent's budget constraints can thus be written as ml + m*l + b1 = T, 
where mt -Mt/Pt, )*t M*t/P*t t t-= Tt/Pt p*t p *tlp*t and P t(P *t) is the domestic (foreign) currency price of importables. Since foreign exchange controls are in effect, the maximum amount of foreign exchange the agent can acquire is m*t M*t/P*t. Therefore, the agent also faces the constraints m*t c mn*t, t = 1, 2.
During the remainder of the period the agent uses the domestic currency he has acquired to purchase domestically produced goods and the foreign currency he has acquired to purchase foreign produced goods. It is assumed that the agent satisfies his demand for goods from domestic sources first, so that his consumption choices must satisfy the cash-in-advance constraints Xt + (pt/pt)Zt ? mt p*t, t ? m t = 1, 2.
The agent then enters period t + 1 with any money he has left over and the process begins again.
The agent's goal in life is to choose Xt, Zt, mt, m*t for t = 1, 2, and bl to maximize (1) subject to (2)-(5). In the framework used here money is required by the exchange mechanism in order to effect consumption purchases but agents can choose whether or not to hold money as a store of value. This portfolio decision will be made so as to maximize wealth, and hence the asset (or assets) with the highest real return wili serve as a store of value. It is straightforward to show (see Helpman, 1981 ) that if nominal interest rates at home and abroad are positive bonds will dominate money as a store of value. This condition is assumed to hold in the remainder of the analysis and hence the cash-in-advance constraints (5), are treated as equalities.
The upshot of the above maximization is summarized by the following marginal conditions:
U1(X') = (1 + r*)pUi(X2),
where al and a2 represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the firstand second-period budget constraints (2) and (3), and Xl and X2 are the multipliers associated with the foreign exchange controls as given by (4). Equation (6) 2 Formally, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the foreign exchange restrictions are n _M*t _ 0, At -0, and A(i*t -m*) = 0, t = 1, 2. Thus whenever the multiplier, A', is greater than zero, the period-t exchange controls are binding. The converse, however, is not generally true. For simplicity, it will be assumed that if the foreign exchange constraint is binding, then the multiplier, A', is strictly positive in value. 3 An interesting area for future research would be to modify the monetary mechanism of exchange so that foreign exchange needed to service any outstanding debt is also subject to foreign exchange controls. In this case foreign exchange controls would also impinge on the intertemporal efficiency condition (7) by driving a wedge between the domestic and world real interest rates in the same manner as do capital controls. 
where mst is the real supply of money in period t, bR is the government's acquisition of interest-bearing reserves in the first period, and ST = (P -P1)/P1 is the domestic rate of inflation. Equilibrium in the domestic money market requires that the demand and supply for money must be equal in each period. Thus 
with Mst defined as the period-t nominal supply of domestic money. The left-hand side of (12) follows from the fact that the exportables market clears in each period, so Xt + XF = Xt. Under a flexible exchange rate system, and given the economy's general equilibrium, (12) determines the equilibrium value of the exchange rate. Under fixed exchange rates (12) determines the supply of money compatible with the specified value of the fixed exchange rate. Finally, international trade must balance intertemporally. This fact is easily deduced by first discounting equation (3) by (1 + r*) and subsequently adding it to (2). Next, eliminate the money terms on both sides of the resulting equation by using the fact that the cash-in-advance constraints given by (5) hold as strict equalities. Last, the transfer payment terms on the right-hand side of the new equation can be removed by using (9) 
As can be seen, in response to various shocks the first-period domestic relative price of importables, p*'(I + q 1), must adjust to equate the domestic demand for imports and the governmentally determined supply of imports, m*llp*'. The imported goods market in an economy with exchange controls thus behaves in much the same manner as do markets for non-traded goods.6 Note 5 The case where foreign exchange controls can be partially circumvented at a cost in terms of real resources is taken up in the seventh section below. 6 For an analysis of non-traded goods see Jones (1974) or, more recently, Greenwood (1984) and Kimbrough (1985) . That controls on international transactions can be analyzed from the perspective of a competitive market generating (implicit) market-clearing prices for the controlled quantity has been discussed, for the case of capital controls by Obstfeld (1986), Adams and Greenwood (1985) , and Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985a).
that with exchange controls in place in the first period, Z1 replaces Z' in the economy's intertemporal budget constraint, (13). To aid in understanding the impact of exchange controls on the economy, consider the impact of relaxing first-period exchange controls.7 This move will allow the agent to purchase additional imports amounting to dZ' /dii*l = 1/p*l. In the light of this, the impact on the agent's welfare level, U, from relaxing exchange controls can be shown from (1), (6), (7), (13), and, (14) to be dU/dim*l =
This expression is easy to interpret. A unit relaxation in first-period exchange controls allows the agent to purchase an additional l/p*l units of first-period imports. The cost of these additional imports is a unit of forgone export consumption. But, as is evident from (6), I/p*l units of extra import consumption is worth (1 + qI) units of export consumption to the agent. Thus, by relaxing the exchange restrictions by a unit, the individual realizes a net welfare gain worth the equivalent of q I units of first-period exports which is converted into utility by multiplying it by the marginal utility of first-period exports, Ul(Xl).
From (14) and (15) The current balance of payments deteriorates in a fixed exchange rate system when first-period exchange controls are relaxed, while under a flexible exchange rate regime the domestic currency depreciates. These results are straightforward. For instance, for the fixed exchange rate case (9) and (12) imply that the current balance of payments, bR, can be written as bR = Xl + p**1(1 + ?
)Z' -TI. Since a liberalization in first-period exchange controls causes the domestic relative price of imports, p*l(1 + p1), to decline, the demand for domestic money falls, implying a worsening of the balance of payments. It should be noted that while a relaxation (tightening) of exchange controls causes a deterioration (improvement) of both the trade balance and balance of payments (or exchange rate), it has a beneficial (deleterious) impact on economic welfare. This last point should be kept in mind by policy-makers who, as mentioned by McKinnon (1979) , often impose exchange controls to improve the balance of payments. In general, policy-makers should recognize that stabilizing arbitrary economic statistics, such as the balance of payments or the trade balance, is not necessarily the same thing as maximizing economic welfare. As a further word of caution to policy-makers, it should be noted that the above line of reasoning can also be employed to show that the anticipation of a future tightening of foreign exchange controls worsens the trade balance and reduces welfare while a permanent tightening of exchange controls also reduces welfare but has an ambiguous impact on the trade balance. Therefore, in manipulating exchange controls to attain trade balance objectives policymakers must be careful to specify the appropriate intertemporal pattern of controls.
Another important feature of exchange controls can be illustrated by supposing, for variety, that the exchange controls are permanently in place and by considering the impact of an anticipated deterioration in the future terms of trade. It is straightforward to show that domestic welfare declines by dU/dp*2 = -Ul(Xl)Z2/(1 + r*).
The impact of this temporary deterioration in the terms of trade on domestic relative prices can be determined by undertaking the appropriate comparative statics exercise on (14) and its second-period analog, Z2(_) = z2, while making use of (18) Thus, an anticipated deterioration in the future terms of trade causes the domestic price of imports to fall in both periods. That is, with foreign exchange controls in place, shocks to world relative prices are negatively transmitted to the domestic economy.8 The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. When the future terms of trade deteriorate welfare declines as (18) illustrates. At the original set of relative prices the agent cuts back on his consumption of both goods in both periods. With the supply of imports fixed, this leads to a drop in their relative price. It should be noted that while the negative transmission of shocks to world relative prices is a characteristic of exchange controls, it is not a necessary characteristic of multiple exchange rate systems such as those discussed near the end of the second section. The logic behind this result is that the quantitative limits imposed by exchange controls sever the link with world markets, causing the domestic market for importables to behave like a market for non-traded goods, while multiple exchange rate systems, like tariffs, drive a fixed wedge between domestic and world relative prices. As a consequence, under multiple exchange rate systems the home country's direct link to world markets is left intact and shocks to world relative prices will be positively transmitted. Of course in practice policy-makers may manipulate import and export exchange rates to achieve certain quantitative targets. In such cases multiple exchange rate systems will function in exactly the same manner as exchange controls.
Finally, the response of today's trade balance to an anticipated fall in the relative price of exports can be analysed for the case of permanent exchange controls. This response is determined by the simple differentiation of the current trade balance definition. This yields dtbl/dp*2 = -X1 ld[p*l(l + N1) ]/dp*2 -X2ld[p*2(1 ?+ q2)/(1 + r*)]/dp*2 + tL 1Z2/(l + r*) > 0. As can be seen, in response to an anticipated deterioration in the future terms of trade the current trade balance improves. Since the volume of imports is being controlled, all the impact on the trade balance occurs through adjustment in the export market. The last term in the above expression illustrates the beneficial impact on the trade balance arising from the drop in welfare and the associated reduction in export consumption. The first and second terms show the improvement in the trade balance resulting from the decline in the current and future domestic prices of imports which leads to a contraction in current export consumption. It should be noted that without exchange controls the effect on the trade balance of an anticipated drop in the future terms of trade is ambiguous. On the one hand, the associated fall in welfare causes current import and export consumption to be cut. On the other hand, the rise in the relative price of future imports tends to stimulate current import and export consumption. The overall change in the trade balance would thus be ambiguous in the absence of exchange controls.9
NOMINAL EXCHANGE CONTROLS
In practice nations often set ceilings on the amount of foreign exchange that domestic residents can hold in nominal terms rather than in terms of imports as was assumed in the previous section. This is probably because nominal targets are less costly to administer. It is not difficult to show that this policy renders the physical volume of imports prone to movements in the world price level and to fluctuations in the terms of trade. To this end assume that the government temporarily imposes a limit, A*P, on the nominal amount of foreign exchange agents can hold during period one.
To begin with, consider the impact of a general increase in first-period world nominal prices (i.e., let dP*l/P*l = dP *I/P1*l so that dp*l = 0). In the first period the amount of imports, Zl, that the agent can purchase is given by Z1 
BLACK MARKETS FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE
It is easy to introduce a black market for foreign exchange into the modelling apparatus. Only a capsule summary of such an extension will be given herethe formal details are provided in Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985b) . Again focus on the temporary exchange control case and assume that there exists a black market in the economy that can divert foreign exchange away from legal to illegal uses at an increasing real resource cost, 4. Specifically, let 4 be a convex function of m* /p* 1 _ m*1 / p* 1 so that 0(.1) = (m* 1 /p* i m* 1 /p* 1) with y1), p1 (.1) > 0. The inclusion of this black market into the economy involves three alterations to the description of the model's general equilibrium: (i) l is now equal to 0j(.l)/p*l which represents the proportionate black market premium for foreign exchange; (ii) the additional supply of first-period imports now available via black market activity, or -l-1(7q1p*1), should be added to the right-hand side of (14); and (iii) the real resource cost involved with running a black market in the first period, 4(.1), should be subtracted from the right-hand side of (13). As can be clearly seen, the spirit of the earlier analysis is essentially retained. The foreign exchange controlled economy with a black market is in a sense a hybrid economy representing a cross between the pure cases of a free trade economy and a perfectly foreign exchange controlled one. To see this, imagine that the agent realizes an improvement in his future endowments of the imported and exported goods. In the free trade case the agent would increase his current consumption of imports at the going terms of trade, while in the foreign exchange controlled case his consumption of imports would remain unaffected while the domestic price of imports rises. In the black market economy both the current price and the quantity of import consumption rise, the former providing the incentive for a larger amount of black market activity.
ENDOGENOUS PRODUCTION
It is also straightforward to extend the analysis to allow for endogenous production. In particular, let the economy's output of the exported and imported goods be modelled in standard Heckscher-Ohlin fashion. The model's main conclusions are unaffected by such an extension. For instance, the than in foreign ones, the devaluation would be associated with an effective tightening in first-period exchange controls in the amount d,in*l /de = -in'*1/. Following the analysis of the previous sections, this would tend to lead to an increase in the relative price of imports, a trade balance surplus, and a further improvement in the balance of payments. In this situation a devaluation has real effects only to the extent that it alters the quantitative incidence of the exchange controls. In practice, devaluations are often purposefully coupled with a liberalization of foreign exchange controls and other quantitative restrictions. This makes it difficult for the economist to discriminate empirically between the effects of a devaluation and the lifting of quantitative restrictions. imposition of temporary exchange controls still increases the domestic price of imports, improves the balance of payments/exchange rate, can have a beneficial impact on the trade balance, and reduces welfare.13 Note that domestic production of the imported good will be encouraged and that of the exported good discouraged by the upward movement in the domestic relative price of imports. Also, the return to the factor used intensively in the import-competing sector rises, and this may provide an explanation for the presence of foreign exchange controls. Indeed, suppose that the home country is inhabited by a large number of individuals with identical and homothetic tastes but endowed with different ratios of the two factors. This extension leaves intact most of the results derived earlier, but if the home country has majority voting, it can provide a rationale for the enactment of exchange controls. As shown by Mayer (1984) , under these conditions the median voter will determine the policy outcome, and if the distribution of individual factor endowments is skewed towards the factor used intensively in the export industry (i.e., if ownership of that factor is highly concentrated) then application of the Stopler-Samuelson theorem implies that tariffs, or related policies such as exchange controls, will characterize the political equilibrium.
OPTIMAL ATTAINMENT OF NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
Foreign exchange controls are enacted for a variety of reasons. Often they are implemented or adjusted during times of economic cnisis so that a target level for the trade balance or balance of payments can be attained. It seems, however, that foreign exchange controls are likely to achieve these objectives at an unnecessarily high welfare cost. To see this, let tbl denote the government's target level for the first-period trade balance. This target is fulfilled when14 X1 -Xi -p *Z' > tbl.
The 'first-best' policy for attaining this goal maximizes the agent's lifetime utility, (1), subject to the economy's intertemporal budget constraint, (13), and the trade balance target, (19). By carrying out the prescribed maximization routine the following set of first-order conditions -in addition the constraints 
where a is the marginal utility of wealth associated with the constraint (13), and 0 is the marginal welfare cost of tightening the trade balance target (19). In order to attain optimally the trade balance target the government must adopt a policy that generates a general equilibrium replicating the set of conditions (13), (19), (20), and (21). First, note from (21) that in each period the marginal rate of substitution between importables and exportables, Vj(Zt + Zt)/UI(Xt), should equal the terms of trade, p*. Thus the optimal attainment of the trade balance target does not involve driving a tariff-like wedge between the domestic and international relative prices of imports. Therefore, exchange controls, while able to attain a trade balance target are not a part of the optimal policy for doing so. Second, as can be seen from (20), in order efficiently to attain the first-period trade balance target, a wedge of [1 + (0/a) ] should be driven between one plus the domestic real rate of interest, U1(X')/pU1(X2), and one plus the world real rate of interest, 1 + r*. The optimal policy involves implicitly taxing the principal and interest on borrowing from abroad at the rate 0/a. Such a policy can be implemented by explicitly taxing international borrowing, by imposing quantitative restrictions on capital flows in the amount tbl, or by instituting a dual exchange rate system with different exchange rates for current account and capital account transactions.15 The essential idea is that a trade balance target is primarily a means of achieving a given intertemporal pattern of consumption and therefore is best attained by policies that directly discriminate against consumption across periods by striking at intertemporal relative prices rather than by policies which discriminate against consumption within periods by striking at intratemporal relative prices.
Regarding balance of payments targets, it is easy to see that the first-best policy for attaining them is a devaluation or a reduction in nominal transfers. This follows directly from the neutrality of money. However, when the government is committed to a certain monetary policy, it can be shown using the above methods that exchange controls alone do not constitute the optimal policy for meeting a balance of payments target (see Kimbrough, 1986 for a detailed treatment of this and other related issues).16
It is not being argued here that enforcing a target level for the trade balance or the balance of payments is a laudable goal; in general it is not. This is easy 15 In more general settings than the one adopted here such policies can have an additional channel of impact on the economy via their impact on the nominal interest rate. For an example of this, see Adams and Greenwood (1985) . 16 Note that foreign exchange controls are an optimal instrument for restricting the volume of imports to some target level, Z1. Formally this can be seen by noting that the marginal con-to see in the above problem, since the government is maximizing the agent's lifetime utility subject to a budget set that is artificially restricted owing to the trade balance constraint (19). Thus in this set-up the economy is at least as well off without a trade balance target as it is with one. What is being argued here, however, is that if the government desires to achieve certain policy goals relating to the various balance of payments accounts, it should pick the policy best suited to attain this goal directly, a point recognized by Johnson (1965).
Those advocating foreign exchange controls should precisely outline the policy objectives of such controls, justify why these goals are desirable, and explain why foreign exchange controls are the best available policy for attaining these ends.
CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, foreign exchange controls effectively place a quota on imports. As a result, they drive the domestic price of imports above the world price in exactly the same fashion as a tariff would. While foreign exchange controls improve both the trade balance and the balance of payments (or exchange rate), they reduce the welfare of a distortion-free small open economy. The first two implications of exchange controls may be a reason that they are so popular. It was also noted that if a standard Heckscher-Ohlin production paradigm is appended to the model, then the factor used intensively in import production benefits from the imposition of such controls. In a political world this may provide an explanation for the presence of foreign exchange controls. Another possibility, and one beyond the scope of this paper, is that exchange controls are imposed as part of an optimal (or non-optimal) public finance expenditure and taxation package. Such controls can expand the base for inflation tax by reducing the degree of currency substitution (see Hercowitz and Sadka, 1984) . In many respects, when foreign exchange restrictions are imposed, the imported goods market behaves in the same manner as a non-traded goods market would. In particular, in the presence of such restrictions shocks to the world terms of trade will be negatively transmitted to the domestic economy. This occurs because the non-traded goods nature of the import market renders only the wealth effect from the world terms of trade shock operational. Also, unlike capital controls, the presence of foreign exchange controls does not constitute a sufficient condition for a devaluation to have real effects. Finally, it has been shown that foreign exchange controls are not the appropriate tool for obtaining a trade balance objective. This is because the trade balance primarily reflects agents' intertemporal decision- 
